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at Hulls Cove 
September 5, 1985 
Distinguished authorities, in the past summer, have come 
h~r~ to share with you their knowledge about w~rld affairs. That 
is not my purpose. I am h~re to share with you my perplexities-
perplexities about the Soviet Union and not my knowledge about 
it. 
Winston Churchill once described it as a ''riddle wrapped in 
an enigma." Chip Bohlen once said the only man who dares boast 
that he knows how to handle a difficult wife is one who never 
tried it; and the only man who dares boast that he knows how 
to deal with the Russians is one who has never tried it. 
There are many men who have done much reading and research 
about Russia, and I have done some, but they all run the risk 
of getting the reproach a member of the House of Commons once 
·hurled at a ·speaker who boasted of his wide reading on a subject. 
A critic ~aid ·he had smothered the feeble spark of hi~ intellect 
. . 
. . 
by the ·vast quantities of fuel he had heaped upon it. All I will 
attempt to do today is to heap a little fuel upon you. I hope 
it doesn't smother the spark of your intellect; but I suspect 
jt will ~ave you as perplexed as I am. 
My. first offering is from Alexis de Tocqueville, who, in 
1835 ·published one of the finest studies of American democracy 
ever writ ten. I quote the following prescient paragraph from 
it: 
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"There are at the present time two great nations in the 
world which started from different points, but seem to tend 
towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. 
The American struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes 
to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former 
combati the wilderness and sa~age life; the latter, civilization 
with all its arms. The conquests of the American are therefore 
gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian.-by the sword. The 
Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his 
ends and gives free scope to the ·unguided strength and common 
sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of 
society i~ a single arm. The principal instrument of the former 
is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point 
is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of 
them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies 
of half the globe." 
It .may be said that this perceptive paragraph is a comment 
on Czarist Russia and not on the Soviet Union. In my opinion 
it is equally relevant as a description of the central philosophy 
of both regimes a concentration of authority, an emphasis 
on the collective will, an indifference toward individual rights. 
I believe that after the Bolshevik take-over there ivas a wide-
spread mistaken notion in this country that ~ liberal revolution 
had occurred in Russia. What had occurred, in fact, was the 
substitution of a despotic party rule for a despotic monarchical 
r u 1 e • Len in be 1 i eve d in the e 1 i t e vanguard o f the mas s e s , the 
dictatorship of the prolet~riat, and he steadily concentrated all 
power in the party, supporting this concentration by the control 
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of press, thought and the use of terror. Stalin made the party 
dictatorship even more arbitrary and more personal and more 
terror...:ridden. His successors have struggled to invest the 
system with greater legitimacy and diminished resort to terror 
but have not abandoned for a moment the despotism of centralized 
rule • For a generation, this counter revolution has masqueraded 
.as a revolution. 
From where does this despotism derive? Solzhenitsyn has 
his explanation. 
he wrote: 
In the Spring 1980 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
"Two mistakes are.especially common (in dealing with Soviet 
affairs). One is the failure to understand the radical hostility 
of communism to mankind as a whole the failure to realize 
that communism is irredeemable, that there exist no 'better' 
variants of communism; that it is incapable of growing 'kinder', 
that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, 
and that, consequently, to coexist with communism on the same 
planet is impossible. Either it will spread, cancer-like, to 
destroy mankind, or else mankind will have to rid itself of 
communism (even then face lengthy treatment for secondary tumor~. 
The second and equally prevalent mistake is to assume an indis-
soluable link between the universal disease of communism and· 
the country where it first sei~ed control - Russia •. This error 
skews one's perception of the threat and cripples attempts to 
r e s p on d s e n s i b 1 y to Jtt., t h u s 1 ea v i n g t he We s t d i s a rm e d • " 
What Solzhenitsyn is talking about is the Russia of the 
orthodox church, of the Russian peasant, of the Russian society 
of the 50 years before 1914 a Russia notable for a cultural 
revolution that exploded in the intellegentsia the Russia 
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of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Pushkin; of Moussorgsky, Rimski 
Korsakov, Tchaikowsky, of the Bolshoi Ballet, and all the other 
explosions of art, science and literature that occurred in spite 
of the authoritarian government of the Romanovs. 
This cultural revolution is beautifully described in the 
Land of the Firebird, Suzanne Massey's new book. It is a des-
cription that does justice to this outpouring of genius among 
the Russian intellegentsia. (Perhaps it does not deal adequately 
()/ 
with the surviving remnants of ancient imperialism which lepd 
to the revolution, but it makes a point for Solzhenitsyn~ 
Contributions of the Russian past of another kind have 
been elaborated on by Zbigniew Brzezinski, when he spoke here 
last year. As. Brzezinski said in a recent book publ'ished by 
the Academy of Political Science: 
"The d i st inc t iv e ch a r a c t er o f the Russ i an imper i a 1 ·d r iv e 
is derived from the interconnection between the militaristic 
organization of the Russian society and the territorial imper-
ative that defines its instinct for survival. As often noted 
by both Russian and non-Russian historians, from time immemorial 
Russian society expressed itself politically through a state 
that was mobilized and regimented along military lines, with 
the security dimension serving as the central organization impulse. 
The absence of any clearly definable national boundary made 
territorial expansion the obvious way of ensuring security. 
Such expansion bred new conflicts, new threats and a further 
expansionary drive. A relentless historical cycle was thus 
set in motion: insecurity, in turn fueled further expansionism." 
American leaders at intervals have chosen to remember the 
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remnants of the cultural Russia in the Soviet Union rather than 
the survival of. the territorial imperative. But, now and then 
reality has intruded as it did when one of them said: 
"The Soviet Union, as everyone who has had the courage 
to face the fact knows, is run by a dictatorship as absolute 
as any other dictatorship in the world. It has allied itself 
with another dictatorship and it has invaded a neighbor so in-
finitesimally small that it could do no possible harm to the 
Soviet Union." That was FDR addressing the American Youth Con-
gress in February 1940. 
This expansionism is the subject. of examination by Arkady 
N • She v ch en k o ' s book Br ea king W i th Moscow in which he s ta t e s 
that Soviet leaders "abhor American armed strength for what 
it could do if properly and consistently directed to frustrate 
Soviet expansion. Furthermore they understand that it is the 
main, if . not only.) barrier to their plans for world domination." 
Shevchenko reports a chilling exchange with Gromyko, in another 
paragraph: 
"One day, while we were 
Vnukovo, I asked Gromyko what 
in U.S. foreign policy toward 
comprehend our fin al goals', 
mistake tactics for strategy. 
at Gromyko's dacha at lunching 
he saw as the greatest weakness 
the Soviet Union. 'They don't 
he re s ponded prompt 1 y • ' An' d the y 
Besides they have too many doc-
trines and concepts, proclaimed at different times, but the 
absence of a solid coherent policy is their big flaw'." 
Lenin in 1917 identified as the main object of the Communist 
party the spread of Communism throughout the world. In ·1917 
in his "Tasks of the Proletariat" he wrote: "there is one and 
only one kind of internationalism indeed; working wholeheartedly 
---------------------------------------------
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for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revol-
utionary struggle in one's own country, and supporting by 
propaganda, sympathy, and material aid such' and only such 
struggle and such line in every country, without exception." 
He described it as the obligation of the first Communist country 
to do "the utmost possible in one country for the development, 
support and awakening of the revolution in all countries.'' 
Erik P. Hoffmann, of the State University of New York, 
has given us a succinct version of Lenin's legend which continues 
to dominate the Communist Party. He wrote in The Soviet Union 
in the 80's, the following: 
"Leadership, in Lenin's view, required an understanding 
of 'the class antagonisms and power relationships within and 
among nations, as well as a passionate but pragmatic commitment 
to create a more harmonious and just social order in Russia 
and eventually throughout the world. Lenin sought to transform 
the Russian Marxist movement into a small, secretive, and hier-
archically structured political party of full-time revolution-
aJr i es , w i th c 1 o s e t i e s to the worker s and other d i s sat i s fie d 
elements of Russian society and eventually to the laboring classes 
of all nations." 
I would like, now, to turn from these comments on the 
theories of government dominating both the Czarist and the Com-
munist state, and touch briefly on the long relationship between 
Russians and Americans. It is a relationship that can best 
be described by borrowing from Herbert Feis the title of his 
book From Trust to Terror; for the dealings between the two 
countries have fluctuated for generations between these two 
contradictory attitudes. 
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The relationship commenced in trust. Here is Thomas Jefferson, 
a lifelong enemy of consolidated, authoritarian government, 
writing to William Duane, the edito~ about Emperor Alexander 
of Russia, in a letter dated July 20, 1807: 
"I have often wished for an occasion of saying a word to 
you on the subject of the Emperor of Russia, of whose character 
and value to us, I suspect you are not apprised correctly. 
A more virtuous· man, I believe, does not exist, nor one who 
is more enthusiastically devoted to better the condition of 
mankind. He will probably, one day, fall a· victim to it, as 
a monarch of that prin_ciple does not suit a Russian noblesse. 
He is not of the very first order of understanding, but he is 
of a high one. He has taken a peculiar affection to this country 
and its government, of which he has given me public as well 
as personal pro~fs. Our nation, being like his, habitually 
neutral, our interests as to neutral rights, and our sentiments 
agree. And whenever conferences for peac~ shall take place, 
we are assured of a friend in him. • ••• I hav~ gone into this 
subject, because I am confident that Russia (while her present 
monarch lives) is the most c~rdially friendly to us of any power 
on earth, will go farthest to serve us and is most worthy of 
conciliation. And although the source of this information must 
be a matter of confidence with you, yet it is desirable that 
the sentiments should become those of the nation." 
Then there is Jefferson's letter to the Emperor of Russia, 
written on April 19, 1806: 
"I owe an acknowledgment to your Imperial Majesty for the 
letter of August great satisfaction 
the 20th, 1805 and 
I have 
embrace 
received from your 
the opportunity it affords of giving 
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expression to. the sincere respect and veneration I entertain 
for your character. It will be among the latest and most soothing 
comforts of my life, to have seen advanced to the government 
of so extensive a portion of the earth, and at so early a period 
of his life, a sovereign whose ruling passion is the advancement 
of the happiness 
own people only, 
and prosperity of his 
but who can extend his 
people; and 
eye and his 
not o;f his 
good will 
to a distant and infant nation, unoffending in its course, un-
ambitious in its views." 
This warm and friendly tone persisted into the exchanges 
of the next Administration and the diaries of John Quincy Adams, 
minister to the Russian Court, are filled with the reports of 
his friendly conversations with. the Emperor Alexander, convers-
ations on official business and on encounters on walks along 
the Quay where he frequently met Alexander. 
In the Monroe administration things got a little dicey. The 
Russians established a colony just North of San Francisco, claimed 
the Pacific, north of the Slst parallel, Russian waters, and 
clashed with the British over boundaiies, and with the Americam, 
British and French over fishing rights. 
John Quincy Adams, now secretary of state, was ·'invblved in 
deciding what to do about these issues in the northwest. Baron 
Tuy 1 , the Ru s s i an mini st er ca 11 e d on Ad ams , to f ind out what 
instructions the State Department was sending to our minister in 
St. Peters.burg. Adams in his diary reports: "I told. him e_specially 
that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial 
establishment on this continent, and that we should assume dis-
tinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer 
subjects for any new European colonial establishments." 
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By 1823, the American government was worried over the Tumors 
that the Qu.~tuple Alliance would intervene in this hemisphere 
to restore to European powers control over former colonies. 
Monroe included in his seventh annual message protests against 
European intervention of any kind, stating that there were great 
differences between the political systems of the allied powers 
of Europe and ours and that we would "consider any attempt on 
their part to extend their system to any portion of· this hemi-
sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 
President John Quincy Adams, in his own administration, 
in his second annual message in 1825 took occasion to note the 
death of the Emperor Alexander, saying that the United States 
had been "deprived of a long-tried, steady and faithful_friend." 
He said the Emperor had been "sensible that the interests of 
his own government would best be pro~oted .by a frank and friendly 
intercourse with this Republic." 
Such cordial expressions about Russia grew rare by 1852. 
Some Americans were frightened by the suppression of the 1848 
revolutionary movements in Europe. The one-time chairman of 
the House Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Winter Davis, tried 
to rouse opinion against Russian leadership of the monarchical 
governments of Europe. He wrote a book called Ormuzd and Ahriman, 
the Zorastrian gods of good and evil. He thought the suppression 
of the European revolts had altered the balance of power in 
Europe in favor of Russia, and inaugurated the Dictatorship 
of Russia in Europe, which he said was "devoted to the ruin 
of all free governments." He favored a union with Great Britain 
to aid the cause of freedom with. arms and money. He warned 
the, Russian agents were ·flitting like demons of the night around 
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the skirts of English dominions and were felt and seen in the 
Afghan War. Davis thought that a Europe "in the hands of Russia 
with all its energies bent on the extirmination of· the intractable 
spirit of liberty and the founding of a perpetual and universal 
despotism" would "menace the liberties, the safety and the exist-
ence of this government." Bewailing the disasters in Hungary 
and Poland and the opposition to freedom elsewhere in Europe 
he concluded: "Nor are these the only sources of foreign danger. 
We are surrounded by feeble and factious republics, the prey 
of eternal war, delivered over to the horrors of civil discord, 
and the very points an ambitious, active and malicious power 
would sieze on to annoy us." He warned: "the protection of 
distance is destroyed when nations at our door sufficiently 
numerous and powerful of themselves seriously to harass if not 
seriously to endanger us, may be stirred up by foreign intrigues, 
armed by foreign money, led by European science." 
The administration did not share Representative Davis's 
views, but he was for a time, a powerful political figure, an·d 
he reflected a segment of American opinion. 
Our own Civil War gave us other problems and during it, 
Alexander sent a Russian fleet to New York to show his support 
for President Lincoln and the Union. The fleet including the 
Almax dropped anchors in New York harbor and stayed from October 
1863 to .f~il 1864. On board the Almax was Rimsky-Korsakov, 
the great Russian composer and friend of Moussorgsky. But the 
most remarkable Russian-American cooperation of that period 
was the Russian sale of Alaska to the United States. The outbreak 
of the Crimean War in 1854 led Russia to believe her American 
colonies were in an exposed position and in 1857 the Russian 
··-~· .' 
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minister to Washington was instructed to hint to this country 
that Russia might be willing to sell Alaska. Negotiations were 
begun in 1859. In February 1867 the Russian minister was instructed 
to enter into negotiations. Agreement was reached and a treaty 
approved on March 30 accomplishing the sale for $7,200,000. 
Congress did not approve the treaty until July 1868 amidst out-
cries of "Seward's Folly." 
The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, ending the Russo-Japanese 
War was mediated by President Theodore Roosevelt in another 
episode of friendly Russo-American relations. 
World War I brought no close collaboration between the 
Americans and Russians like that of World War II and the Bolshevik 
revolution took Russia out of the war and ended diplomatic 
relations between the two countries until 1933. 
Two serious attempts to gain U.S. recognition were made 
by the Soviet Union from 1920 to 1933, but were rebuffed. There 
was rising trade between the two countrie~ but it did not assume 
major proportions in world commerce. Given the proclaimed pur-
poses of the Soviet state it may not have been too unreasonable 
on the part of the U.S. government. 
./. 
in its second con~itution stated: 
In 1928, the Comintern, 
''The new International Association of workers is established 
for the purpose of organizing common activity by workers of 
various countries who are striving towards a single aim: the 
overthrow of capitalism, the establishment of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and of the International Soviet Republic, 
for the abolition of classes and the realization of socialism 
the first step toward a Communist society." 
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Notwithstanding 
the United States 
in the Soviet Union. 
such bold proclamations of hostile intent, 
did engage in extensive relief operations 
It contributed more than 67 million dollars 
for the relief of the 1921-22 famine. 
Then came the long collaboration of World War II. Soviet-
American relations, as the war ended, were conducted in an atmo-
sphere of surprising trust, considering the different principles 
of the two countries. Then came the unraveling of the wartime 
coalition best described in the great book by Herbert Feis, 
From Trust to Terror. The historic territorial imperative of 
the Communist Party took over the policy of the government .and 
a period of characteristic expansion reasserted itself, extend-
ing the Soviet Empire to new limits in the center of Europe 
and to the far reaches of Asia. 
The emergence of nuclear weapons gav~ to the growing East-West 
confrontation new aspects of terror. The United States government 
under President Eisenhower proposed the formation of a United 
Nations Nuclear Agency to eliminate the risks of nuclear war, 
but a Soviet veto in the Security Council ended this most far-
reaching effort to check a nuclear arms race. Technical advances 
have made 
th~ the 
nuclear weapons infinitely more powerful and dangerous 
two atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities. Those 
weapons could inflict destruction in a three mile radius. Minute 
Man II extended the area of destruction to 72 square miles. 
The MS missile pushed out 293 miles. Soviet weaponry in SS18 
and SS19 series achieved greater destructive power. 
The number of U.S. weapons remained quite stable in the 
sixties, but the Soviet Union pressed forward with the great-
est military build-up in recorded history. The Soviet strategic 
- 13 -
arms build-up overtook U.S. nuclear weaponry in 197 2. As of 
July 1983 the United States had 1,045 ICBMs, the Soviet Union 
1,398. The Soviet Union had 941 submarine launched missiles, 
the United States 568. The Soviet Union had 375 bombers to 
U.S. 271 bombers. The balance in all kinds of delivery vehicles 
stood at 1,884 ·for the United States to 2, 714 for the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union had 7, 700 warheads; the United States 
7,297. The Soviet nuclear arsenal had a throw-weight of 11.8 
million pounds to the U.S. 4.4 million pounds. The United States 
launchers were generally 15 years old; the Soviet launchers 
5 years old. 
As the accuracy and range and throw-weight of missiles 
increased, each side acquired the ability to wipe out the other's 
land based missiles in a first strike. That would leave the 
victim with the option of submittingorof making a massive response 
that would destroy the enemy and, if unlimited, might end life 
on the planet. 
The two nations are in the perilous .position of scorpions 
in a bottle. 
The leaders of the Soviet Union and of the United States 
are to meet in November to see if these risks of war can be 
diminished. 
The problems and potentials for that meeting, in my opinion 
were best set forth last March by Paul Nit~e, who often has 
been a guest here in the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture entitled 





1963 when he and other defense 
mul ti-laterral to bi-lateral 
experts shifted 
negotiations and 
concluded that a level of perhaps 500 strategic nuclear weapons 
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for each side might be appropriate. President Johnson and 
Secretary of Defense McNamara took a proposal to have a freeze 
on 500 strategic nuclear weapons to Glassboro in June 1967 and 
got the message that negotiations on this might not be impossible. 
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in · 1968 temporarily made that 
impossible and Salt I negotiations were deferred until the fall 
of 1969. 
Nit~e pointed out that the Soviets in 1972 passed the United 
States in the number, size and throw weight of offensive strategic 
missile systems and deployed one generation after another of 
more modern systems while the United States had frozen the number 
of our weapons systems and restrained the modernization ;of our 
weapons. 
The Niu~e address put the goal of American policy in a 
single sentence: "Our hope and intent is to shift the deterrent 
balance from one which is based primarily on the punitive threat 
of devastating nuclear retaliation to one in which nuclear arms 
are greatly reduced by both .sides and non-nuclear defences play 
a greater and greater role." 
What is the chance of getting the Soviets to agree to that? 
Judging by the past, we would have to say they are not 
very good. But we surely must try. Some optimists think that 
the appearance of Chairman Gorbachev may improve the situation. 
Such students of Soviet policy as Konstantin Simis, formerly 
of the Institute of International Relations of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of the Soviet Union takes a gloomy view in the current 
issue of FOREIGN POLICY. He says: 
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"Unfortun~t~ly the available evidence about the new Soviet 
generation justifies scant optimism. Gorbachev and his political 
peers have so. far shown every sign that their main interest 
is preserving the domestic status quo, and especially the polit-
ical structure through which they have risen. For these leaders 
are first and foremost creatures of a Soviet system that has 
evolved into a ·"partocracy," in which a fusion of the party 
and government apparatus now permits the former to control comp-
letely the legislative, executive and judicial branches. As 
a result, Western leaders and analysts· should not be fooled 
by the cosmetic changes and tactical deviations that will be 
made in Soviet foreign policy in the years to come. Domestically 
and internationally, what the new generation has in mind is 
more of the same." 
I cannot leave our subject withou~ letting in a final con-
fusing word by that old dissenter George Ball in a recent issue 
of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. He writes: "One of the 
sagest admonitions in George Washington's Farewell Address was 
that we Ame~icans should beware of 'inveterate antipathies against 
particular nations." 'The nation,' he said, 'that indulges 
toward another an habitual hatred is in some degree a slave. 
It is a slave to its animosity •••• which is sufficient to lead 












readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes 
of umbrage , and to be ha ugh t y and intra c tab 1 e when a cc id en ta 1 
or trifling occasions or disputes occur.' 
"That advice has particular relevance today", Ball said, 
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"for our government is exhibiting toward the Soviet Union such 
an 'habitual hatred' as to make it, in Washington's phrase, 
'to some degree •••• a slave to its animosity'." 
Slavery to any passion or emotion ought to be avoided where 
the survival of the nation and of mankind is involved; but so 
should sentimental and wishful credulity leading to the eager 
embrace of wishful and unfounded expectations. If the forth-
coming negotiations do not succeed, we must try again. And 
if they continue to fail, we must carefully examine the acts 
that we might undertake unilate~ly to diminish the risk of 
destroying life on this planet. 
No one is optimistic enough to believe that the forthcoming 
conference will even deal with the fundamental source of Soviet-
American East-West conflict arising from both the historic expan-
sionism of the Russian state and the Soviet Union's L ~epeate~ly 
restated object of world-wide revolution. 
Many Americans have hoped that time might diminish the 
missionary zeal of the aggressive religious faith to which the 
Soviet Union adheres. It has diminished and moderated many 
other fanaticisms in the past. Other great empires have finally 
come to understand that a friendly neighbor is better than a 
surly colony, as Turgot explained to imperial France. Such 
a conversion does not seem imminent today. Nevertheless, given 
the options we have, maybe the West should make more concerted 
efforts to seek the moderation of the Soviet Union's hostile 
drive to conquer the world. In the interim, the best we can 
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It will remain a grim world indeed, if we can neither 
diminish the menace of the arms race, or alter the philosophy 
that has created it. 
x x x 
